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SBERT 

MILITARY  FEATURES  OF 
THE  PANAMA  CANAL 


BANCROFT 
UBRAftY 


University  of  California  •  Berkeley 


Some  of  the  Military 

Features    of   the 

Panama  Canal 


MILITARY  LECTURE 

BY 

BRIGADIER  GENERAL  WM.  L.  SIBERT 
U.  S.  ARMY 


Eighth  in  Seriti  of  Lecturel  on  Military  Tofict 


PALACE  HOTEL 

Friday,  March   17,  1916 


SAN  FRANCISCO 
1916 


Some    of    the    Military    Features 
or   the    Panama    Canal 


SOME  OF  THE  MILITARY  FEATURES  OF  THE 
PANAMA  CANAL 

WHILE  we  all  hope  and  expect  that  peace  will 
be  the  rule  and  war  the  exception  and  that 
consequently  the  commercial  use  of  the  Panama 
Canal  will  engage  our  attention  most  of  the  time,  still 
in  my  opinion  it  was  n  military  need  for  such  a  water- 
way that  concentrated  public  thought  to  such  an 
extent  as  to  force  the  t'on-ress  of  the  United  States 
to  embark  upon  this  gigantic  undertaking,  fraught 
with  many  physical  difficulties  and  with  many  latent 
but  probable  foreign  complications.  It  was  a  re- 
enforcement  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  by  a  ship  from  the 
Pacific  in  the  Spanish-American  \Yar  that  brought  the 
question  to  a  vote. 

When  the  United  States  undertook  to  connect  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  by  a  canal  through  a  foreign  soil, 
it  embarked  upon  an  enterprise  in  which  the  world  had 
a  legitimate  interest  because  it  is  just  as  much  every 
nation's  duty  to  see  that  its  people  have  an  equal  op- 
portunity in  the  trade  of  the  \vorld  as  it  is  to  repel  a 
foreign  foe.  This  interest  of  the  world  was  finally 
acknowledged  in  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty,  which 


document  placed  upon  tho  United  States  alone  the 
.  duty  of  maintaining  the  neutrality  of  this  Canal.  Any- 
thing, therefore,  that  affects  our  existence  and  power 
as  a  nation  affects  our  ability  to  perform  that  duty. 
That  duty  carries  with  it  automatically  the  right  to 
create  any  instrumentalities  that  would  facilitate  its 
performance.  Under  this  theory  we  have  fortified  the 
entrance  to  this  canal  and  will  in  time  of  war  so  con- 
trol and  use  this  waterway  as  to  best  assure  our 
national  strength  unimpaired. 

This  canal  is  practically  our  Southern  border  and 
is  a  short  route  between  the  two  great  parts  of  our 
country,  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Coasts,  and  it  will 
ultimately  divide  by  more  than  two  the  former  freight 
rates  between  the  two  sections,  which  means  that 
many  industries  yet  unborn  on  the  Pacific  Coast  will 
spring  into  existence,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  reduced 
transportation  charges  will  enable  the  products  from 
such  industries  for  the  first  time  to  stand  transporta- 
tion costs  and  to  enter  the  markets  of  eastern  United 
States  and  of  the  world  and  compete.  It  also  means  a 
quick  way  of  concentrating  naval  forces  in  either 
ocean  and  means  some  reduction  in  the  naval  needs  of 
the  United  States  but  not  the  reduction  that  many 
seem  to  think.  The  navy  in  either  ocean  should  always 
be  big  enough  to  make  it  unsafe  for  an  enemy  to 
attempt  to  transport  a  large  expeditionary  force  across 


the  ocean  in  the  earlier  stages  of  a  war.  Without 
tin-  Canal  the  protection  of  our  interests  in  each  ocean 
would  be  practically  a  separate  problem  throughout. 

This  Canal  is,  therefore,  of  great  strategic  impor- 
tance, both  from  a  commercial  and  military  stand- 
point, and  like  all  strategically  important  points  or 
lines  will  naturally  be  one  of  the  first  objectives  of  an 
enemy,  especially  of  an  enemy  that  has  a  naval  superi- 
ority in  the  ocean  immediately  involved  and  which 
superiority  would  disappear  when  available  naval  re- 
i-iifnrcemcnts  were  passed  through  the  canal.  Such  an 
enemy  would  take  unusual  risks  in  the  attempt  to 
accomplish  a  purpose  so  vital  as  blocking  the  canal. 
In  consequence  of  this  the  sound  of  guns  coxering  the 
landing  of  troops  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  may  be 
'!)«•  actual  declaration  of  war  and  history  is  certain  to 
record  naval  lores  of  this  Isth- 

mus and  the  clashing  of  arms  in  its  jungles.  If  the 
I  "nited  States  has  an  outlying  possession  that  must  be 
held  it  is  the  Canal  at  Panama.  Holding  it  may  deprive 
an  enemy  of  his  only  chance  to  inflict  heavy  damage 
upon  one  of  our  coasts,  and  it  is  hoped  that  history 
will  never  re-cord  the  fact  that  the  pride  of  this  nation 
has  been  lowered  by  the  loss  of  this  Canal.  It  would 
be  a  much  coveted  part  of  an  indemnity  imposed  at 
tlie  end  of  a  losing  war.  If  engaged  with  a  combina- 
tion of  enemies  that  controlled  both  oceans,  the  defense 


of  the  Canal  would  fail  unless  the  United  States  had 
effective  railroad  facilities  through  Mexico  and  Central 
America  that  could  be  used  for  the  transportation  of 
troops — even  with  this  its  defense  would  be  most 
difficult. 

Great  facilities  and  great  strategic  appliances  can 
only  be  made  and  maintained  through  great  effort, 
prizes  only  come  when  earned,  and  when  a  nation 
ceases  to  strive  it  ceases  to  grow,  especially  in  its 
virile  elements. 

As  previously  stated,  we  have  constructed  sea- 
coast  fortifications  at  both  ends  of  the  Canal  and  may 
build  more,  but  seacoast  defense  is  only  one  cog  in 
the  wheel,  one  element  of  the  great  machine  neces- 
sary for  war.  These  defenses  within  themselves, 
wherever  they  are,  in  this  country  or  Panama,  only 
deny  the  enemy  the  immediate  use  of  the  most  impor- 
tant harbors,  the  immediate  privilege  of  using  the 
docks  and  railroad  systems  radiating  therefrom  for 
advances  to  the  interior,  and  the  immediate  opportu- 
nity of  collecting  a  heavy  indemnity  from  the  wealth 
of  industries  segregated  at  such  harbors.  Their  mili- 
tary function,  therefore,  is  to  force  the  enemy,  if  he 
lands,  to  land  at  more  difficult  places  where  transpor- 
tation and  other  facilities  are  meager  or  lacking,  and 
where  the  mobile  force  stands  a  better  chance  to  force 
him  back  to  his  ships  or  delay  him  until  re-enforce- 


nuMits  can  pre\rent  him  from  capturing  the  coveted 
harbors  by  land  operations. 

The  defense  of  the  country  is  made  through  a 
great  machine  in  which  each  branch  in  proper  propor- 
tion is  necessary.  Each  element  may  think  itself  the 
most  important  but  no  element  can  succeed  without 
the  assistance  of  the  others,  and  our  people  must  not 
be  blind  to  this  and  think  that  because  their  particular 
harbor  is  protected  from  immediate  occupancy  that 
the  country  is  safe  and  that  no  great  mobile  force  is 
necessary. 

In  continental  l/nited  States  the  largest  part  of 
the  necessary  mobile  force  must  be  some  form  of  citi- 
zen soldiery  or  volunteers,  but  in  Panama  the  initial 
blow,  the  strongest  blow,  the  one  most  difficult  to 
meet,  must  be  met  by  a  complete  and  efficient  war 
machine  of  sufficient  si/.e  on  the  ground  at  the  out- 
break of  war,  and  consequently  must  be  composed  of 
regular  troops  of  all  arms.  A  force  that  has  studied 
the  problems,  knows  the  terrain,  and  has  made  all 
possible  preparations  as  to  strategical  and  tactical 
lines  of  operation  and  communication  so  that  it  can 
quickly  occupy  and  hold  the  best  positions  for  the 
accomplishment  of  the  task  presented.  A  force  ready 
to  strike  advantageously  the  enemy  wherever  he  lands 
and  big  enough  to  overcome  him  or  hold  him  until 
re-enforcements  can  surclv  come. 


We  can  always  ivst  assured  that  the  enemy  is  at 
least  as  alive  to  the  salient  points  of  a  military  situa- 
tion as  \ve  are.  If  we  leave  undone  those  things  that 
should  be  done,  where  our  dereliction  is  greatest  the 
punishment  will  be  the  most  severe.  Jf  an  enemy 
should  have  undisputed  possession  of  the  locks  at 
either  end  of  the  Canal  for  a  few  hours  only  our  water- 
way across  the  continents  could  be  placed  out  of  com- 
mission for  the  war  and  our  naval  strength  in  -either 
ocean  could  only  be  augmented  after  the  long"  iournc\ 
around  the  Horn.  Whether  one  of  the  coasts  in  a 
republic  such  as  ours  could  or  would  prevent  in  time 
of  war  a  transfer  of  its  naval  protection  by  way  of  the 
Horn  to  the  other  coast,  especially  if  a  mysterious 
appearance  of  an  enemy's  cruiser  or  two  were  reported 
at  times,  you  can  guess  as  well  as  I.  We  all  remember, 
however,  the  number  of  phantom  Spanish  Fleets  that 
continued  and  continued  to  appear  off  many  places  on 
our  eastern  coast  in  the  Spanish-American  War,  until 
Ccvera  was  actually  located  in  Santiago  Harbor,  and 
we  all  remember  the  force  brought  to  bear  to  have 
each  city  especially  guarded. 

Being  the  most  remote  and  younger  half  of  the 
Republic,  the  Pacific  Coast  is  the  greater  beneficiary 
of  the  Panama  Canal  and  is  more  vitally  concerned 
than  the  East  in  such  steps  being  taken  as  will  cer- 
tainly assure  its  existence  and  maintenance  during 
war. 


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Jn  continental  United  States  it  matters  very  little 
whether  our  regular  army  is  150  or  175  thousand  men; 
some  more  comprehensive  scheme  for  training  larger 
numbers  of  our  citizens  must  be  decided  upon  ;  its 
increase,  however,  to  the  extent  necessary  to  provide 
and  keep  garrisons  at  war  strength  at  all  times  in 
outlying  posses-ions  that  are  of  great  strategic 
importance,  which  especially  includes  Panama  and 
Hawaii,  is  an  imperative  national  need.  The  existence 
and  manning  of  the  seacoast  defenses  at  Panama 
means  that  the  enemy  must  land  out  of  reach  of  those 
seacoast  guns  and  must  resort  to  land  operations  to 
take  t'ne  '.anal,  and  the  existence  of  no  obstruction 
except  the  lire  of  a  well-drilled  body  of  mobile  troops 
«>f  vi'fficient  si/.c  can  deter  him  or  prevent  him  from 
accomplishing  his  purpose.  A  jungle  is  no  defense. 
It  is  only  a  screen  to  the  enemy's  movements  and  may 
be  an  advantage  to  him.  And  with  modern  appliances 
that  and  any  other  inanimate  obstacles  can  be  quickly 
overcome. 

There  is  no  military  movement  more  effective 
than  one  that  results  in  the  permanent  division  of  the 
enemy's  forces,  and  the  capture  of  the  Canal  would 
certainly  do  that  so  far  as  our  Xavy  is  concerned  and 
probably  leave  one  of  our  oceans  and  one  of  our  coasts 
at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy. 

The  policy  adopted  by  the  United  States  with  its 
working  force  on  the  Canal  has  often  been  referred  to 


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as  an  example  of  applied  Socialism.  The  Government 
fed,  housed  and  doctored  the  employees,  did  their 
laundry  and  baking  and  furnished  all  other  supplies 
for  them  and  their  families.  All  this  was  not  Socialism 
but  was  simply  an  application  of  Army  methods  to  a 
great  construction  job  on  which  all  needed  money  was 
available,  which  enabled  those  methods  to  be  thor- 
oughly tried,  with  the  result  that  there  was  created  on 
this  Canal  one  of  the  most  efficient  and  contented 
organizations  that  ever  existed,  which  organization 
was  provided  with  the  most  effective  machines  that 
money  could  buy.  If  those  charged  with  the  construc- 
tion of  the  Canal,  under  such  circumstances,  did  not 
accomplish  large  quantities  of  work  quickly  and  eco- 
nomically it  would  certainly  have  been  the  fault  of  the 
management.  All  that  the  Army  asks  is  a  machine  of 
proper  capacity,  time  within  which  to  bring  the  vari- 
ous parts  of  this  machine  to  bearing,  and  time  within 
which  by  extended  and  frequent  maneuvers  to  train 
the  higher  ranking  officers  in  the  art  of  command.  The 
world  has  produced  fewer  really  great  military  com- 
manders than  the  really  great  in  any  other  profession, 
in  many  cases  the  failure  to  measure  up  to  the  stand- 
ard was  due  to  lack  of  support  in  creating  the  machine. 
Imagine  the  problem  if  it  was  necessary  to  move 
the  inhabitants  of  this  city  ten  or  fifteen  miles  every 
day,  supply  them  with  food,  water  and  ammunition, 


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keep  their  temporary  abode  in  hygienic  condition  and 
at  the  same  time  to  so  maneuver  them  as  to  force  an 
engagement  with  an  enemy  with  the  chance  of  win- 
ning on  your  side,  and  to  do  all  this  with  an  equal 
force  trying  to  block  each  element  of  the  proceedings. 
You  get,  in  this  way,  a  slight  idea  of  the  duties  of  a 
commander  of  troops  and  appreciate  to  some  extent 
the  need  not  only  of  thoroughly  training  each  part  of 
an  army  but  of  developing  team  work  by  maneuvers 
on  a  large  scale  so  as  to  give  practice  to  all  in  the  art 
of  war. 

\\"e  have  been  in  existence  as  a  nation  for  more 
than  a  century  and  neither  in  our  organization  or  sub- 
sequent changes  in  the  instruments  of  government 
ha\  e  we  been  moved  by  a  patriotic  impulse  sufficiently 
strong  to  force  a  proper  solution  of  our  military  prob- 
lems and  we  never  will  until  each  man  under  forty-five 
years  of  age  is  ready  to  do  his  part  in  the  defense  of 
the  nation  and  to  prepare  himself  for  the  efficient 
performance  of  that  duty. 


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